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NEUROSCIENCE AND YOU: Introduction
Introduction
In the early 1990’s Former President George H. W. Bush declared the “Decade of the
Brain.” As he put it, the purpose of such a declaration was to “enhance public awareness of the
benefits to be derived from brain research” (Bush, 1990.) This declaration was brought about
through the intense urging of a dedicated group of scientist who were passionate about the
neurological discoveries of the 20th century and acutely aware of the benefits these discoveries
could have for society at large (Goldstein, 1994). Spearheaded by the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
and backed by the Bush Administration, public funding and publish support for neuroscience
research flourished.
This declaration left a lasting impact on the public that is still felt today. In 2010, a group
of neurophilosphers conducted a content analysis on all of the news articles published between
1995 and 2004 from major U.S. and U.K. English-language news sources (Racine, Waldman,
Rosenberg, & Illes, 2010). The time period corresponds to the height of the “Decade of the
Brain.” Racine (2010) were particularly interested in understanding public support for the
neurosciences through media coverage of technologies in the field. They found that during the
ten-year period, 1,256 articles reported on the brain and neuroscience technology in some
capacity (Racine et al., 2010). The tone of these articles was overwhelmingly positive; however,
even in articles that were considered “research reports” very little detail about these technologies
and discoveries were provided (Racine et al., 2010). Racine’s findings highlight a very important
concern in the sensationalism of neuroscience findings and the lack of public understanding
about these findings.
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The primary objective of this work is to address how members of the public both
consume and understand neuroscience information. This overarching question will be tackled in
two distinct studies. The first questions the validity of sensationalizing neuroscience findings
through investigating the effect of neuroscientific information on assessments of moral
judgments. The second study proposes a manner by which we can correct the spread of
misinformation in neuroscience utilizing social media platforms.
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The Influence of Scientific Explanations on
Assessments of Moral Responsibility
Ciarra Smith and John Bickle
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INTRODUCTION
As science advances, we become better at ascribing causal relationships between
biochemical processes and behavior. Scientists are certain that mutations to BRCA1 and or
BRCA2 genes increase the risk of developing cancer later in life (Miki et al., 1994). However,
scientists are less certain how mutations in monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) are associated with
violence and aggressive behavior (Buck, 2014). Even still, scientific information has been used
in criminal proceedings as a means of reducing sentencing in some cases. In some instances
sentences were reduced from first-degree murder to a lesser charge of second-degree murder
(Bernet, Vnencak-Jones, Farahany, & Montgomery, 2007). The distinction between first- and
second-degree hinges entirely on the perception of premeditation or in other words, impulsivity.
Furthermore, the precise influence of scientific data in courts has been difficult to
determine. When presented with scientific explanations for behaviors, judges are likely to find
the same data mitigating or aggravating in determining punishment (Feresin, 2009). In one study
conducted on U.S. state trial judges, researchers found cases that included biochemical data were
likely to be interpreted by the judges as mitigating factors but in those instances, the judges were
also likely to point towards a larger number of other factors that they considered aggravating
(Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012). In a population of college students and suburban residents,
another research team attempted to examine differences in perceived culpability when
participants were presented with physiological explanations (chemical imbalance) or experiential
explanations (abusive parents) (Monterosso, Royzman, & Schwartz, 2005). Monterosso et al,
found physiological explanations to have a higher influence on the reduction of culpability.
However, the research team only addressed instances in which the characters described in the
vignettes performed actions deemed negative or immoral.
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The present study goes a step further by assessing changes in perceived culpability when
the actor performs both a generally positive or moral action and a generally negative or immoral
action. Additionally, the present study subdivides the “physiological” explanation into two
categories, neuroscience and genetics. The reason for division emphasizes the novel use of the
magnetic resonance imaging as evidence for mitigating information in courts (Aspinwall et al.,
2012). Consistent with previous studies, we believe physiological explanations will have more
influence on participants in reducing culpability in both negative and positive actions.
Furthermore, we posit neuroscience explanations as likely to have greater influence in
assessments of blame and responsibility relative to genetic or experiential/psychological
information due to its popularity in the public sphere.

METHOD
The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at
Mississippi State University. All participants viewed a consent form and agreed to participate.

Participant Characteristics
Four hundred Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants ages 18 or older and
located in the United States were invited to participate in the web-based survey. The participants
were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. Participants who failed the manipulation
check were excluded from the survey (N = 12). The results of three hundred and eighty-eight
participants are reported here (Table 1). The mean age of the participants was 34.8 (SD = 10.69)
with 63% identifying as male. In regard to race and ethnicity, 76.3% of participants were white,
15.5 % were black or African American, 6.2% were Asian, and 14.7% were Hispanic or Latinx.
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Participants were more well-educated than the U.S general public with 62.9% holding a
bachelor’s degree or higher (compared to 30.9% in the general population; United States Census
Bureau, 2017). The political ideology of the participants skewed toward liberal with 12.9%
identifying as very liberal, 32.3% as liberal, 8% as very conservative, and 20.1% as conservative.
Participation in this study was voluntary and participants were compensated $0.75 for
completion of the survey.

Measures
Participants viewed one of two short vignettes of an actor performing in an impulsive
action. They also evaluated a series of five false science statements and six true science
statements (statements were taken from Kahan, 2017, and Smith, Davern, Freese & Hout, 2018)
to measure science literacy. Participants were asked to rate whether each statement was true or
false. Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the level to which they agreed or
disagreed with statements addressing deference to scientific authority (Brossard & Nisbet, 2007),
science-efficacy (Fives, Huebner, Birnbaum, & Nicolich, 2014) and a free will inventory
developed by Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross (2014). The free will inventory
evaluated the participants belief in free will, determinism, and dualism. All statements are
provided in the appendix.

Stimulus
The vignettes were taken from Knutson (2010) and were determined from Knustson’s
study to be relatively equal in terms of morality/immorality in which one vignette was deemed
moral and the other immoral. The two were also relatively opposite equivalents in norm
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violation, social affect, and intentionality. Vignettes are provided in the appendix. Participants
were asked to evaluate the action and actor on the morality of the action, moral responsibility of
the actor, blameworthiness of the actor, likelihood of recidivism, and a self-evaluation
(Monterosso et al., 2005).

Research Design
The experiment was embedded in a web-based Qualtrics survey that was administered to
approximately 400 adults (aged 18 or older) in the U.S. through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) in February 2019. Participants were paid $0.75 for completing the survey. It utilized a 2
(Action: positive vs. negative) x 3 (Scientific Explanation: neuroscience, genetics,
environmental) between-subjects experimental design with one “no explanation” control group.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions.
In the scientific explanation conditions, participants viewed a short vignette describing an
action that was considered to be either moral or immoral. Then scientific information about the
actor was presented to the participant. In the neuroscience condition, participants were informed
that “[a]n fMRI scan of this individual’s brain indicates increased activity in the VTA of the
prefrontal cortex. This region of the brain is highly correlated with the regulation of impulsive
behavior. Other individuals with this level of activity have been known to engage more often in
impulsive behavior.” In the genetic condition, participants were informed that “[a] sample
analysis of this individual’s blood indicates reduce expression of the gene coding for 5-HIAA.
This molecule is highly correlated with the regulation of impulsive behavior. Other individuals
with this level of expression have been known to engage more often in impulsive behavior.” In
the environmental condition, participants were informed that “[a]n inquiry into this individual’s
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background indicates high rates of petty theft and violent crimes in their childhood
neighborhood. These crime rates are highly correlated with individuals who display impulsive
behaviors. Other individuals from these types of neighborhoods have been known to engage
more often in impulsive behavior.” After viewing one or none of these additional scientific
explanations, participants were asked to evaluate the morality of the action, the moral
responsibility of the actor, the blameworthiness of the actor, the likelihood the actor will commit
the action again, and the degree to which the participant felt they would perform the action given
the same scientific factors where true of them.

RESULTS
The hypothesis presents a variation in the type of scientific explanatory information on
the assessment of five factors, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, likelihood of recidivism,
beliefs about self, and the morality of the action. The hypothesis explicitly posits neuroscientific
explanations has the most likely to move beliefs about all five factors relative to the no
explanation control subjects. The present study utilizes multiple independent paired t-tests to
evaluate the effectiveness of the scientific explanations to alter responses to the five factors when
participants are confronted with both a positive and negative action.
The results for the free will assessment were combined into an index and are as follows.
On a seven-point scale, participants had a higher belief in free will (M = 5.1, SD = 1.2, α =
0.856) than determinism (M = 3.7, SD = 1.51, α = 0.892) and dualism (M = 2.4, SD = 1.36, α =
0.67). Out of a total of nine points, participants had an average science literacy of 6.9 (SD =
1.67). The science efficacy of the subjects was relatively high at 4.0 (SD = 0.68, α = 0.799) on a
five-point scale. The participant’s deference to scientific authority was also relatively high 3.9
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(SD = 0.80, α = 0.664) on a five-point scale. All questions can be found in the appendix. Lastly,
we collected demographic items provided in the participant characteristics (Table 1).
Table 1
Demographics
Characteristic
Age, mean
Science Literacy
Belief in Free Will
Belief in Determinism
Belief in Dualism
Deference to Scientific Authority
Science Efficacy
Characteristics
Education
High School graduate or GED
Some college
Technical School
Associate Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Some postgraduate
Master's Degree
PhD, law, or medical degree
Gender
Male
Female
Other
Ethnicity/Race
White
Black or African American
Asian
Hispanic/Latino
American Indian/Alaska Native
Other
Political Leaning
The Republican Party
The Democratic Party
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M
34.8
6.9
5.1
3.7
2.4
3.9
4.0

(SD)
10.69
1.67
1.2
1.51
1.36
0.8
0.68

n

%

48
59
7
30
185
6
41
12

12.4
15.2
1.8
7.7
47.7
1.5
10.6
3.1

244
141
2

63.0
36.4
0.5

296
60
24
57
11
8

76.3
15.5
6.2
14.7
2.8
2.1

44
57

43.6
56.4
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Ideology
31
8.0
Very Conservative
78
20.1
Conservative
104
26.8
Moderate
125
32.2
Liberal
50
12.9
Very Liberal
Religious Attendance
15
3.9
More than once a week
69
17.9
Once a week
45
11.7
Once or twice a month
49
12.7
A few times a year
54
14.0
Seldom
154
39.9
Never
Table summarizes the participant demographics for study one. The top section of the table
presents mean and standard deviations for the scales and indexes. The bottom section of the table
contains the percentage of the tested population exhibiting the specified characteristic.
Positive Action
Overall, participants exposed to the scientific explanation containing an environmental
explanation for behavior were the most likely to produce significant changes in belief relative to
no explanation control subjects (refer to Table 2). In the question of moral responsibility, those
exposed to the environmental explanation indicated a significant reduction in attributing moral
responsibility of the actor to the performed action comparative to the control (M=5.01, SD =
1.64, t73.558= 2.139, p < 0.05). This reduction is smaller but not significant when compared to the
mean score from participants exposed to the neuroscientific explanation (M = 5.32, SD = 1.42,
t77.754 = 0.921, p = 0.360). While participants exposed to the genetic explanation for behavior did
not significantly differ from control subjects (M = 5.84, SD = 1.03, t95.619 = -0.615, p = 0.543)
this reduction in assessment of moral responsibility was the only significant distinction across all
measures comparatively to the neuroscientific explanation subjects (t87.327 = -2.074, p < 0.05).
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Concerning factor two, beliefs about blameworthiness interpreted here as an attribution of
accountability, all experimental groups reported a greater attribution comparative to the no
explanation control group (M = 5.69, SD = 1.32). The neuroscientific explanation (M = 4.82,
SD = 1.64), the genetic explanation (M = 4.67, SD = 1.96), and the environmental explanation
(M = 4.83, SD = 1.70) expressed no significant variation between the three factors in an one-way
analysis of variance [F(2, 135) = 0.236, p = 0.79].
Factor three, an assessment of the actor’s likelihood of recidivism based on the scientific
explanation, found a significant reduction only with the presentation of the environmental
explanation (M = 4.68, SD= 1.31, t85.313 = 2.396, p < 0.05). Again, this difference was significant
comparatively to the mean value for participants who viewed a neuroscientific explanation (M =
5.47, SD = 1.17, t78.800 = 2.984, p < 0.05).
The fourth factor asked participants to rate their likelihood of committing the same action
given the scientific explanations provided for the fictitious actor was true of them. Similar to
factor two, all explanations provide a marginal increase in the belief that the participants would
perform the action relative to the control (M = 4.37, SD = 1.75). However, in a one-way
ANOVA neither of the explanations produced significant results [F(2,135) = 0.405, p = 0.668].
The final factor asked participants to assess the morality or immorality of the action. No
explanation control subjects evaluated the action as highly moral (M = 6.13, SD = 1.19) on a
seven-point Likert scale. This assessment is comparative to the mean value of morality
determined from the original article (Knutson et al., 2010). Across all three experimental groups,
the presentation of the scientific explanations for behavior reduced assessments of the actions.
Again, the only experimental group that showed significance were the participants who viewed
an environmental explanation for the actor’s actions (M = 5.03, SD = 1. 39, t76.793 = 4.045, p <
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0.001). Additionally, this value is significantly smaller than the means from participants who
viewed neuroscientific explanations (M = 5.80, SD = 1.43, t83.985 = 2.547, p < 0.05). However,
the variation between the genetic explanation group (M = 5.86, SD = 1.19) is non-significant
comparative to the neuroscientific explanation group (t91.311 = -0.245, p = 0.807).
Table 2: Mean values for
the Positive Action
Control
N = 52
M
SD

Factor
Q1: This person is morally
5.69
responsible for their actions
Q2: This person is
3.48
blameworthy for their actions
Q3: This person will commit
5.35
this action again
Q4: Try to put yourself in
this person’s shoes. If all the
4.37
same facts were true of you,
do you think you would have
behaved the same way?
Q5: This action is immoral 6.13
moral
*
p<0.05 compared to control
**
p<0.001 compared to control
✝
p<0.05 compared to neuroscience
✝✝
p<0.001 compared to neuroscience

Neuroscience
N = 49
M
SD

Genetics
N = 49
M
SD

Environmental
N = 40
M
SD

1.32

5.32

1.42

5.84✝

1.03

5.01*

1.64

2.10

4.82**

1.64

4.67*

1.96

4.83*

1.70

1.36

5.47

1.17

5.26

1.35

4.68*✝

1.31

1.75

4.61

1.67

4.86

1.81

4.56

1.55

1.19

5.80

1.43

5.86

1.19

5.03**✝

1.39

Negative Action
In evaluating the variation in assessments for the same five factors, participants who read
the vignette of an actor performing a negative action were much more likely to produce a change
in belief relative to the control as a result of the genetic and neuroscientific explanations (refer to
Table 3). In factor one, those exposed to genetic (M = 5.20, SD = 1.51) and neuroscientific (M =
5.65, SD = 1.29) explanations recorded a reduction in moral responsibility relative to the control
groups (M = 5.88, SD = 1.34). Only the genetic explanation was significant comparatively to the
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control groups (t97.027 = 2.402, p < 0.05). The environmental explanation (M = 6.23, SD = 1.21)
suggested an increase in moral responsibility comparatively to the neuroscientific explanation
group (t94.994 = -2.300, p < 0.05).
Concerning factor two, a similar trend was determined. Attribution for accountability is
reduced when participants viewed a neuroscientific explanation for behavior comparatively to no
explanation control subjects (M = 5.50, SD = 1.57, t73.894 = 3.631, p < 0.001). The same can be
said for participants who viewed genetic explanations for the actor’s behavior (M = 5.24, SD =
1.55, t74.695 = 4.734, p < 0.001). The environmental explanation did not significantly differ from
the control but did from groups that viewed either the neuroscience or genetic explanations (M =
6.17, SD = 1.43, t72.604 = 1.014, p = 0.314).
There was some variation in the assessment of factor three, a determination of the
likelihood of recidivism. Participants who were exposed to neuroscientific explanations (M =
5.62, SD = 1.38) and those exposed to environmental explanations (M = 5.50, SD = 1.50) where
slightly more likely to suggest the actor would commit the action again relative to the control (M
= 5.49, SD = 1.101). Participants that viewed genetic information were slightly less likely to
believe the actor would commit the action again relative to the control (M = 5.28, SD = 1.26).
On the fourth factor, all four factors increased the participants’ beliefs that they might
also perform the same action given the circumstances described in the explanations.
Neuroscience and genetic explanations again play the largest role in influencing the participants’
beliefs. An independent paired samples t-test showed the neuroscientific explanation to produce
a significant effect on assessments of personal likelihood to commit the action (M = 4.00, SD =
1.87, t97.629 = -2.743, p < 0.05). Those exposed to genetic information also produced a significant
increase (M = 3.92, SD = 1.83, t97.098 = -2.568, p < 0.05). Participants exposed to the
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environmental explanation produced a marginal increase in believing themselves likely to
commit the same action comparative to the no explanation control group (M = 3.39, SD = 2.40).
In the final factor, participants were asked to assess the morality or immorality of the
action. The no explanation control subjects rated the action at a 2.56 on a seven-point Likert
scale in which 1 was immoral and 7 was moral. This value is about equivalent to the mean score
determined in the original work by (Knutson et al., 2010) The presentation of the explanations
only slightly increased the morality of the action. Those exposed to the neuroscientific
information determined the action to be only marginally less immoral or marginally more moral
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.59, t95.689 = -1.557, p = 0.123). Participants who viewed the genetic
explanation also reduced determined the action to be slightly less immoral (M = 3.24, SD = 1.71,
t97.268 = -1.901, p = 0.60). Again, those viewing environmental explanations reduced the
immorality of the action (M= 2.87, SD = 1.72, t94.982 = -0.856, p = 0.394).
Table 3: Mean Values for
Negative Action

Factor
Q1: This person is morally
responsible for their actions
Q2: This person is blameworthy
for their actions
Q3: This person will commit this
action again
Q4: Try to put yourself in this
person’s shoes. If all the same
facts were true of you, do you
think you would have behaved
the same way?
Q5: This action is immoral moral
*

Control
N = 51
M
SD

Neuroscience
N = 50
M
SD

Environmental
N = 47
M
SD

5.88

1.34

5.65

1.29

5.20*

1.51

6.23✝

1.21

6.41

0.83

5.50**

1.57

5.24**

1.55

6.17✝

1.43

5.49

1.01

5.62

1.38

5.28

1.26

5.50

1.50

2.90

2.15

4.00*

1.87

3.92*

1.83

3.39

2.40

2.56

1.86

3.10

1.59

3.24

1.71

2.87

1.72

p<0.05 compared to control

**

Genetics
N = 50
M
SD

p<0.001 compared to control
14
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✝

p<0.05 compared to neuroscience
p<0.001 compared to neuroscience

✝✝

DISCUSSION
It must first be made clear that none of the three types of explanations are currently
known to be causal. Given the multitude of differing explanations to exonerate and absolve
individuals of blame it is important to determine how differing types of scientific explanations
influence popular perception of blame and accountability.
In the case of the positive or moral action, environmental explanations overwhelmingly
influence beliefs about a fictitious actor comparatively to either neuroscience or genetic
information when the action performed in generally considered positive or moral. In the case of
the negative action, there was a tendency of physiological information to have greater influence
on assessments, of blame, responsibility, and morality as expected. However, the expected
greater influence of neuroscience explanations or neuroscience information was disproved. The
data suggests that as of now, there is very little distinction between how types of physiological
scientific information is internalized and analyzed among members of the public.
The findings of this study enhance the general body of knowledge on attribution theory
given the context of science and morality. Kelley's (1973) work in attribution theory further
divides the model into internal (personality) and external (situational) attribution. Furthermore,
the phenomena of the correspondence bias explains peoples’ tendency to apply greater
importance to internal attributes rather than external attributes when assessing another’s
behavior. Additionally, previous studies indicate that belief in free will is positively correlated
with the correspondence bias (Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). Given the high evidence of
belief in free will in the tested subjects it would be expected that all of the scientific explanations
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should move participants to evaluate blame and responsibility in similar direction for the positive
and the negative actions; however, there was a clear distinction in which types of scientific
explanation were likely to influence perceptions of culpability depending on the perceived
morality of the action. The explanations address internal attributions it is plausible that the tested
subjects perhaps perceived physiological explanations (neuroscience and genetics) as external
attributes. Although this determination is outside the scope of this study, it does pose a question
to be considered in further studies of the effect of science as a mitigating or aggravating factor in
perceptions of moral responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
The scientific and healthcare communities must often contend with a misinformed public.
In 2017, a measles outbreak hit a small Somli-American community in Minnesota (Hall, 2017).
Of the 65 confirmed cases, 62 individuals where unvaccinated (Hall, 2017). The community
decision to not vaccinate against the disease was directly linked to concerns raised in 2008 about
the false association between the development of autism and receiving the MMR vaccine (Hall,
2017). This case, and others like it, go beyond a lack of understanding on the topic at hand, but
include a deeply held belief in false information. Misinformation spread among a local or even
national community can have deleterious consequences for local and national health. If not
addressed, misinformation in public health can and will undermine evidence-based public health
efforts (Tan, 2015; van der Meer, 2018).
Correcting misinformation is notoriously difficult. However, it is suggested that one of
the best methods for correcting misinformation is the immediate presentation of corrective
information following the misinformed belief (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook,
2012). In line with this thread of reasoning, researchers attempted to address the peer-to-peer
spread of misinformation via social media by means of Facebook’s “related story” algorithm
(Bode & Vraga, 2015). The research provides some promising results, among individuals who
held misperceptions about the relationship between GMOs and illnesses, those exposed to
debunking articles experienced a change in belief. Participants who viewed mixed message
articles where not likely to change their beliefs (Vagra and Bode, 2015). The present study
adopts the methodology of Vagra and Bode with a few additional modifications particularly by
attempting to correct misconceptions in neuroscience (hereafter referred to as neuromyths)
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Addressing misinformation in fields such as neuroscience where public interest in high
polarized language is low can help us to generalize a unique method for misinformation
correction in the health sciences. This study utilizes neuromyths established by OECD and
Dekker and attempts to correct the misinformation using a modified version of the Varga and
Bode strategy that take advantage of Facebook’s “related article” feature. The primary study uses
a 3 (Neuromyth: language acquisition vs. 10% brain vs. hemispheric dominance) x 5 (Related
article position: confirm misinformation, correct misinformation, confirm then correct
misinformation, correct then confirm misinformation, unrelated) between-subjects experimental
design with one “no message” control group. We evaluate three separate myths with varying
levels of public belief in order to test the ability of suggested news articles to sway belief in
misinformation across a more generalized topic. We believe that among participants who believe
neuromyths, belief change (as measured by changing from “True” to “False” and a decrease in
certainty) will be greater among those exposed to correcting related articles than those exposed
to confirming, mixed, or unrelated related articles

METHODS
This research protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at
Mississippi State University. All participants viewed a consent form at each phase or research
and agreed to participate.

Participant characteristics
One thousand, three hundred and thirty-nine Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
participants ages 18 or older and located in the Unites States were invited to participate in the
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pretest survey. The mean age of participants was 36.7 (SD = 11.6), and 48% identified as female.
In regard to race and ethnicity, 84.2% identified as white, 8.8% identified as black or African
American, 6.8% identified as Asian and 10.9% identified as Hispanic or Latinx (a full break
down of participant characteristics can be found in Table 4). Pretest participants were slightly
more well-educated than the general U.S. population with 53.8% having a bachelor’s degree or
higher (compared to 30.9% in the general population; (compared to 30.9% in the general
population; U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). The pretest population was skewed slightly liberal.
Forty-six-point-one percent of participants identify as Democrats, 25.8% identify as
Republicans, and 26.4% identified as Independents. Participants were asked about their
Facebook usage and over 50% indicated they use the social media platform several times a day.
All pretest participants were asked to participate in the main experiment. Seven hundred
and forty-four participants completed the main experiment in addition to the pretest experiment.
There were very few significant differences in the characteristics of the pretest participants
comparatively to the main experiment participants. The main experiment subjects were slightly
more literate in science (M = 8.83, SD = 1.73, t1336 = -2.84, p = 0.005). Additionally, main
experiments were less religious than pretest participants (χ2(1) = 12.30, p = < 0.001).
Demographics Table
Characteristic

M (SD)

Age, mean (SD)

36.7 (11.6)

37.7 (12.0)

*Science Literacy

8.70 (1.80)

8.83 (1.73)

Pretest

Experiment

% (n)

% (n)

0.6 (8)
1 (13)
8.1 (109)

0.4 (3)
1.2 (9)
8.2 (62)

Education
Less than high school
Some high school
High School Graduate / GED
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Some college
Associate degree (Occupational/vocational program)
Associate degree in college (Academic program)
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Professional School Degree
Doctorate degree (For example: PhD, EdD)
Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity/Race
White
Black
Asian
*Hispanic/Latino
American Indian /Alaska Native
Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander
Other
Political Leaning
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other
Ideology
Very conservative
Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
Very liberal
Religious attendance
More than once a week
Once a week
Once or twice a month
A few times a year
Seldom
Never
Facebook Usage
Several times a day
About once a day
A few days a week
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21.9 (293)
7.1 (95)
7.6 (102)
39.8 (533)
10.5 (140)
1.9 (25)
1.6 (21)

21.7 (163)
8 (60)
7.7 (58)
41.1 (309)
9.3 (70)
1.5 (11)
0.9 (7)

51.7 (692)
48 (643)

53.1 (399)
46.5 (350)

84.2 (1128)
8.8 (118)
6.8 (91)
10.9 (146)
1.9 (26)
0.1 (1)
1.6 (21)

83 (624)
10.6 (80)
6.6 (50)
8.5 (64)
1.3 (10)
0 (0)
1.9 (14)

25.8 (345)
46.1 (617)
26.4 (353)
1.8 (24)

23.8 (179)
45.6 (343)
28.7 (216)
1.9 (14)

7 (94)
18.6 (249)
27.7 (370)
31.8 (426)
14.9 (199)

5.7 (43)
18.2 (137)
28.2 (212)
34 (256)
13.8 (104)

4.2 (56)
15.6 (209)
8.7 (116)
12.2 (163)
17.6 (236)
41.7 (559)

3.9 (29)
13.3 (100)
7.7 (58)
11.6 (87)
18.5 (139)
45.1 (339)

57.1 (716)
20.7 (260)
13.2 (165)

57.5 (408)
21.2 (150)
12.8 (91)
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Every few weeks
Less often
Children must acquire their native language before a second language
is learned. If they do not, neither language will be fully acquired
We only use 10% of our brain
Differences in hemispheric dominance (left brain, right brain) can help
explain individual differences amongst learners.

5.6 (60)
3.4 (43)

4.5 (32)
3.9 (28)

69.4 (929)

71.9 (541)

55 (736)

54.1 (407)

16.8 (225)

16.2 (122)

*religion χ2(1) = 12.30, p = < 0.001
*science literacy t(1336) = -2.84, p = 0.005
Measures
Pretest. In the pretest, participants were asked age and frequency of Facebook use. The
participants were then asked to evaluate three neuromyths and three true statements about
neuroscience (see Table 1) from Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012) and selected
from a larger set of statements evaluated in a pilot test. Participants also evaluated a series of five
false science statements and six true science statements to measure science literacy (Kahan, 2017
and Smith, Davern, Freese, & Hout, 2018). Neuroscience and general science statements were
mixed together and presented in a random order for each participant. Participants were asked to
decide wether each statement was true or false and then to rate their certainty regarding the
correctness of each response. Participants then responded to demographic items.
Experiment. After viewing the experimental manipulation, participants reevaluated the
six neuroscience statements from the pretest. If participants viewed related articles (see Research
Design), they evaluated each related article as novel, useful, interesting, trustworthy, credible,
and accurate. Participants then completed measure of science efficacy (Fives et al., 2014),
deference to scientific authority (adapted from Brossard & Nisbet, 2007), and need for cognition
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The present paper will only address the evaluates of the neuroscience
statements, other measures will be addressed in a future publication
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Research Design
Pretest. A web-based Qualtrics survey was administered to approximately 1,334 adults
(aged 18 and older) in the U.S. through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in October 2018.
Pretest participants completed the measures noted above and were paid $0.25 for completing the
survey. Approximately two weeks after completing the pretest, participants were invited to
participate in the experiment.
Experiment. The experiment was embedded in a web-based Qualtrics survey. It utilized
a 3 (Neuromyths: language acquisition vs. 10% brain vs. hemispheric dominance) x 5 (Related
article position: confirm misconception, correct misinformation, confirm then correct
misinformation, correct then confirm misinformation, unrelated) between-subjects experimental
design with one “no message” control group. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 16
conditions.
In message conditions, participants viewed a simulated Facebook post sharing one of
three particular neuromyths (varying by condition; see Experimental Manipulations below). The
post included a statement from the Facebook user and a newspaper article that included of the
three neuromyths. The post was followed by two related articles that varied by condition. All
participants were paid $0.50 for completing the survey.

Experimental Manipulations
Participants in message conditions saw a simulated Facebook page that features a news
article posted by a user whose name and image had been covered (See Figure 1). The simulated
news article was introduced by the anonymous user with a simple exclamation (e.g., “See, we
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only use 10% of our brains!) that corresponded to the news article. The news article shown
varied according to condition (Neuromyths: language acquisition vs. 10% brain vs. hemispheric
dominance). Each news article included the sample simple image of a brain, a headline, and a
brief summary, and appeared to come from The WashingtonPost. (The Washington Post was
chosen to follow the methodology used by Bode and Vraga, 2015). On the simulated Facebook
page, the statement and article were followed by two related articles that varied according to
condition (Related article position: confirm misinformation, correct misinformation, confirm
then correct misinformation, correct then confirm misinformation, unrelated). These articles
consisted of an image of the source’s logo (the first article was always attributed to Snopes.com
and the second to the American Medical Association, sources used by Bode and Vraga, 2015), a
headline, and a brief article summary. User introductions, article headlines, and article
summaries were crafted to be as similar as possible across conditions (See Figure 1 for
examples).
Data Analysis
Experiment participants were divided into one of 16 conditions in which they viewed one
of three neuromyths (language acquisition vs. 10% brain vs. hemispheric dominance).
Participants were asked to evaluate six neuroscience equations as true or false and indicate their
level of certainty in their answer, on a 7-point Likert scale during both the pretest and the
experiment. The participants correctness score was determined as follows. If participants
correctly identified their neuromyth (based on condition) as false, it was coded as +1 for correct.
If participants incorrectly identified their neuromyth (based on condition) as true, it was coded as
-1 for incorrect. This score was then multiplied by their level of certainty for a new score that
ranged from -7 (very certain and incorrect) to 7 (very certain and correct). The correctness score
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was calculated from both the participant’s pretest data and experimental data. We considered this
variable interval or analysis purposes.
A neuromyth change score was calculated and utilized as the dependent variable for this
study. The change score was determined by subtracting the participants pretest correctness score
from their experimental correctness score. This variable ranged from -14 (incorrect) to 14
(correct). To test our belief that those who initially believed the neuromyths and were presented
with correcting messages, change in belief would be greater we conducted a two-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of neuromyth change by neuromyth, related stories, and the interaction
between those two factors.

RESULTS
In order to address the hypothesis, we conducted a two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the participants’ change score as the dependent variable. The ANOVA tested our
two factors, neuromyth by related article condition. The neuromyths were selected based on the
results of a pilot study in which participants were asked to evaluate whether a set of general
science and neuroscience questions were true or false. Neuromyth 1, the belief that children
needed to acquire a first language before a second, was widely believed to be false with 71.9% of
experimental participants correctly identifying the myth as untrue. Neuromyth 2 suggested that
the average human only uses 10% of their brain. This myth was identified correctly as false by
54.1% of experimental participants. Lastly, neuromyth 3 was the most widely believed myth in
the tested population with only 16.2% correctly identifying the myth as untrue (Table 4). The
two-way ANOVA yielded a main effect of neuromyth, F(2, 685) = 7.796, p<0.001 such that the
greatest positive change in belief occurred in neuromyth 3 (Figure 1). The mean change of
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The additional to neuromyth, the primary factor in the present study was the related
article condition. A two-way ANOVA yielded a significant main effect by related article, F(4,
685) = 4.446, p = 0.001 (Table 6, Figure 2). The greatest positive change for participants
occurred within subjects who were presented with two correcting articles (M = 0.573, SD =
5.48). The greatest negative change for participants occurred with subjects who were presented
with two confirming articles (M = -1.444, SD = 480) and with subjects who were presented with
unrelated articles (M = -1.204, SD = 4.70). The mixed conditions in which one article was
confirming and one article was corrected produced relatively similar results with a slight
advantage to the conditions in which the corrective article was attributed to the American
Medical Association (M = 0.202, SD = 5.11). The mixed condition in which the corrective article
was attributed to Snopes.com produced similar results with a mean of 0.127 (SD = 5.71). The
two-way ANOVA did not produce a significant interaction effect [F(4, 685) = 0.716, p = 0.677]
among the two factors.
Table 6. Estimated marginal means by related article
condition
95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Upper
Related article position
Mean Std. Error
Bound
Bound
-1.444
0.414
-2.258
-0.63
Confirm misinformation
*
0.573
0.443
-0.297
1.443
Correct misinformation
*
0.127
0.459
-0.773
1.028
Confirm/Correct misinformation
*
0.202
0.428
-0.638
1.042
Correct/Confirm misinformation
-1.204
0.442
-2.071
-0.337
Unrelated
Table presents the mean change scores by related article condition and across all three
neuromyths. The greatest positive change occurs in the two correcting related articles position
(correct misinformation). Additionally, significant positive change occurred in the two mixed
conditions. There was not significant difference between the confirm misinformation and the
unrelated article conditions.
*
significance of p < 0.05 comparatively from confirming misinformation related article condition
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Concluding Remarks
The field of neuroscience is rapidly changing, and the public is deeply interested in its
progression. Neuroscience information has crossed over into a number of different other field
including but not limited to ethics, marketing, and education (Illes et al., 2010). The combination
of neuroscience and various other field highlights the natural influence neuroscience can and
does have on society. For this reason, this thesis explores just a few of the interactions between
neuroscience and other aspects of culture.
The first study addresses the impact of neuroscience on our perceptions of other people.
The seductive allure of neuroscience explanations (SANE) effect describes the ability of
neuroscience information to cloud our judgments (Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray,
2008). It is the idea that neuroscience is so enchanting, it causes us to belie things we would not
ordinarily believe were neuroscience information not present. The SANE effect can mislead us
into believing that this effect is specific to neuroscience while that may not be the case.
Neuroscience information is intriguing to the public but many members of the public are not yet
distinguishing neuroscience from other physiological sciences. The finding begs a more careful
understanding of what neuroscience data can and cannot be used as evidence and courts and
highlights a greater need for more research on public interpretation of neuroscience data.
The second study presents and interesting method for social media companies to utilize in
the fight against “fake news” and misinformation. As mentioned, there is much work left to do
on how best to implement such an algorithm such that it protects our natural rights and freedoms
of expression but also tampers down the spread of inaccurate data. Both studies provide a
framework by which we can begin to assess how members of the public are responding to
laboratory science. Research in this field is critical and this work is only the tip of the iceberg.
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Appendix
Study 1: Influence of Scientific Explanations on Assessments of Moral Responsibility

1.1 Vignettes
1.1.1 Positive Vignette: During my commute through downtown, I see a lot of homeless
people. One day I was driving and saw a homeless woman walking her dog. I pulled over
and gave her some money.
1.1.2 I was staying with a friend who lived in a house of a very famous man. There were many
autographed books in the house. I stole one of the books, which was autographed by a
very famous celebrity.

1.2 Scientific Explanations
1.2.1 Neuroscience: An fMRI scan of this individual’s brain indicates increased activity in the
VTA of the prefrontal cortex. This region of the brain is highly correlated with the
regulation of impulsive behavior. Other individuals with this level of activity have been
known to engage more often in impulsive behavior.
1.2.2 Genetics: A sample analysis of this individual’s blood indicates reduce expression of the
gene coding for 5-HIAA. This molecule is highly correlated with the regulation of
impulsive behavior. Other individuals with this level of expression have been known to
engage more often in impulsive behavior.
1.2.3 Environmental: An inquiry into this individual’s background indicates high rates of petty
theft and violent crimes in their childhood neighborhood. These crime rates are highly
correlated with individuals who display impulsive behaviors. Other individuals from
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these types of neighborhoods have been known to engage more often in impulsive
behavior.

1.3 Deference to Scientific Authority (Brossard & Nisbet, 2007)
1.3.1 Scientist know best what is good for the public
1.3.2 It is important for scientist to get research done even if they displease people by doing it.
1.3.3 Scientist should do what they think is best, even if they displease people by doing it.

1.4 Science Efficacy Questions (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014)
1.4.1 I know when to use science to answer questions.
1.4.2 I can use science to make decisions about my daily life.
1.4.3 I know how to use the scientific method to solve problems.
1.4.4 It is easy for me to tell the difference between scientific findings and advertisements.
1.4.5 I can tell the difference between observations and conclusions in a story.

1.5 Free Will Inventory
1.5.1 Free Will Subscale
1.5.1.1 People always have the ability to do otherwise.
1.5.1.2 People always have free will.
1.5.1.3 How people’s lives unfold is completely up to them.
1.5.1.4 People ultimately have control over their decisions and their actions.
1.5.1.5 People have free will even when their choices are completely limited by external
circumstances
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1.5.2 Determinism Subscale
1.5.2.1 Everything that has ever happened had to happen precisely as it did, give what happened
before.
1.5.2.2 Every event that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions, was
completely determined by prior events.
1.5.2.3 People’s choices and actions must happen precisely the way they do because of the laws
of nature and the way things were in the distant past.
1.5.2.4 A supercomputer that could know everything about the way the universe is now could
know everything about the way the universe will be in the future.
1.5.2.5 Given the way things were at the Big Bang, there is only one way for everything to
happen in the universe after that.
1.5.3 Dualism/Anti-Reductionism Subscale
1.5.3.1 The fact that we have souls that are distinct from our material bodies is what makes
humans unique.
1.5.3.2 Each person has a non-physical essence that makes that person unique.
1.5.3.3 The human mind cannot simply be reduced to the brain.
1.5.3.4 The human mind is more than just a complicated biological machine.
1.5.3.5 Human action can only be understood in terms of our souls and minds and not just in
terms of our brains.

Study 1: Correction of Misinformation in Neuroscience Using Social Media
1.1 Neuromtyhs (Dekker et al., 2012)
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1.1.1 Children must acquire their native language before a second language is learned. If they
do not, neither language will be fully acquired.
1.1.2 We only use 10% of our brain.
1.1.3 Differences in hemispheric dominance (left brain, right brain) can help explain individual
differences amongst learners.
1.2 Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)
1.2.1 I prefer complex to simple problems.
1.2.2 I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
1.2.3 Thinking is not my idea of fun. [Reverse coded]
1.2.4 I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities. [Reverse coded]
1.2.5 I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think
in depth about something. [Reverse coded]
1.2.6 I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
1.2.7 I only think as hard as I have to. [Reverse coded]
1.2.8 I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones. [Reverse coded]
1.2.9 I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. [Reverse coded]
1.2.10 The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
1.2.11 I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
1.2.12 Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. [Reverse coded]
1.2.13 I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve.
1.2.14 The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
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